Exploring the Reality of Science: Is it Truly "Real?"
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Chapter 1: The Question of Scientific Reality
When I was in the ninth grade, I found myself pondering a thought-provoking question: Is science genuinely “real,” and does it hold significance if it isn’t? At that time, we were just beginning to explore various scientific principles.
In physics, we engage with concepts like energy, force, and power—elements that are not physical matter. Chemistry, on the other hand, introduces us to tangible matter such as atoms and molecules. As we delved deeper into these subjects, I couldn’t help but ask: Are these concepts really “real?”
To a scientist, or anyone who has faith in the scientific method, the answer is a resounding “yes.” However, a closer examination of the history of science suggests that this affirmation may not be entirely accurate.
In this article, I aim to introduce the notion of scientific anti-realism, which posits that scientific entities and concepts—like force, energy, and particles—do not exist in the natural world as we perceive it. Instead, they are merely representations created by the human mind to interpret reality.
I’m not asserting that anti-realism is the ultimate truth; rather, I want to highlight the significance of this perspective. To illustrate this, I will present two arguments: the prima facie argument from instrumentalism and a more compelling argument rooted in the history of science.
Section 1.1: The Instrumentalist View
Scientific instrumentalism argues that scientific concepts and entities lack intrinsic meaning; their significance arises solely from their utility. In other words, terms like “gravity” and “energy” are human constructs designed to help us navigate and understand the physical world.
For example, consider the statement: “Objects fall to the Earth due to gravity.” Instrumentalists would argue that this should not be taken literally. Instead, it should be interpreted as: “We use the concept of gravity to explain why objects descend towards the Earth.”
To simplify this further, think about the phrase: “That is blue.” It can be understood in two ways. The literal interpretation would assert that the term “blue” exists as an object. The instrumentalist interpretation would state that there is an object exhibiting the color blue. The latter understanding makes more sense, as we use color as a descriptor rather than claiming that “blue” exists independently.
This analogy encapsulates the instrumentalist perspective on scientific concepts; terms like “gravity,” “electrons,” and “force” function similarly to color descriptors.
Subsection 1.1.1: The Value of Instrumentalism
It’s important to note that those who advocate for scientific anti-realism are not against science itself. In fact, they seek to comprehend the true nature of scientific knowledge.
One reason to adopt an instrumentalist viewpoint is the way we acquire scientific knowledge, which differs significantly from everyday knowledge. For instance, consider the contrast between understanding “gravity” and a “cup.”
Physicist Pierre Duhem suggested that grasping scientific concepts is not analogous to identifying a physical object, like a cup. One can easily point to a cup and declare, “This is a cup.” However, to comprehend “gravity,” one cannot simply indicate a falling object and say, “This is gravity.” Understanding gravity requires familiarity with a network of related concepts, such as force and acceleration.
Thus, the inability to immediately observe scientific concepts suggests that they may not be as “real” as everyday objects like cups.
Section 1.2: The Historical Perspective
In 1962, philosopher Thomas Kuhn published a groundbreaking work titled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which significantly challenged scientific realism, particularly the notion of logical empiricism.
Kuhn argued that scientific advancement is not a straightforward, cumulative process. Instead, it occurs through revolutionary shifts where the scientific community adopts entirely new paradigms. These major transformations throughout scientific history provide compelling evidence that scientific concepts and entities might not be genuinely “real.”
For instance, the understanding of combustion has evolved dramatically. Currently, we learn that combustion involves oxygen, but prior to this discovery, chemists believed in the concept of “phlogiston.” It was only with Antoine Lavoisier’s work in the late 18th century that the phlogiston theory was debunked, paving the way for the recognition of oxygen.
If scientific entities were truly “real,” such radical transformations in understanding would be difficult to explain, as “real” concepts do not undergo such drastic changes.
Chapter 2: The Social Constructivist Approach
Kuhn’s theories have inspired a contemporary branch of scientific anti-realism known as social constructivism, which posits that knowledge is generated through various social influences.
According to Kuhn, the production of scientific knowledge is contingent on the prevailing paradigm of the scientific community. When faced with significant anomalies, the scientific community may collectively shift to a new paradigm, leading to spontaneous revolutions in scientific thought.
Observing the historical shifts in scientific understanding, one might find it challenging to believe that these concepts are genuinely “real.”
Section 2.1: The Implications of Scientific Anti-Realism
For many trained in the sciences, accepting the idea that science may not be “real” can be a difficult notion. But the critical question remains: does it truly matter?
Most would likely respond with a resounding “not really.” Scientific anti-realism does not negate the legitimacy of science. Instead, it offers a perspective on the nature of scientific knowledge, promoting an attitude of epistemic humility.
Philosopher Bas van Fraassen, for instance, advocates for constructive empiricism, suggesting that whether science refers to “real” entities is less important than its effectiveness in explaining the world around us.
In this context, it doesn’t matter if “oxygen” is a tangible entity in the physical world, as long as it is consistent with our findings and enables us to achieve significant feats, such as space travel.
Van Fraassen’s position parallels pragmatism, which asserts that the truth of an idea hinges on its practical utility.
In our technology-driven world, it can be challenging to view scientific knowledge as anything but concrete. However, this perspective may be necessary as we navigate an era increasingly reliant on technological advancements and artificial intelligence.
Ultimately, while science may not represent an absolute reality, it serves a crucial role in our understanding of the world around us.
The first video, They Might Be Giants - Science is Real (official TMBG video), celebrates the significance of scientific inquiry and knowledge in a fun and engaging way.
The second video, Science is Real - They Might Be Giants, further emphasizes the importance of understanding science in an entertaining format.